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December 1989 ABSTRACT 
This paper discriminates  between three potential sources of 
instability in parameter estimates of stock return models. 
First,  mean expected returns may vary with time.  Second,  return 
volatility may change.  Third,  observed returns may be affected 
by institutional factors as the trading mechanism evolves.  To 
study this,  we model stock returns as a stochastic function of a 
constant expected return and the financing costs resulting from 
an institutional feature, delayed delivery.  We then use Goldfeld 
and Quandt's (1976)  D-method of switching regression, 
deterministic switching based on time, to study the structural 
change in our model.  We examine two eight-year sample periods 
and find that both contain a regime shift driven by an abrupt 
change in volatility.  In addition, the switches occur during 
critical events affecting the economic environment: the first 
switch occurs during the turmoil of an international monetary 
crisis amid important Watergate developments,  and the second is 
on the first trading day after the reappointment of Paul Volcker 
as chairman of the Federal Reserve Board.  Although parameters 
estimating the impact of time-varying expected returns and the 
delivery system are in some cases qualitatively different between 
the regimes, the differences are not statistically significant 
and do not produce changes in our model of stock returns. Regime  Changes in Stock  Returns 
Changes in stock returns and in the parameters of stock return models 
have long been of interest to financial economists.  Mehta and Beranek 
(1982),  for example,  use switching regressions to study changes in a stock's 
volatility  (as  measured by the Capital Asset Pricing Model's  /3  coefficient) 
across different regimes.  They find that the parameter esrimates of their 
model change considerably through time.  More recently,  Keim and Stambaugh 
(1986),  Fama and French (1988),  and Chan  (1989)  examine long-run expected 
stock returns,  concluding that expected returns are cyclical and 
predictable.  French,  Schwert,  and Stambaugh  (1987)  study the link between 
expected stock returns and volatility,  reporting that the conditional 
variance of stock returns is a significant determinant of expected stock 
returns.  Bollerslev  (1987)  and Baillie and Bollerslev  (1989)  show that 
conditional heteroscedasticity characterizes much financial data;  this 
suggests that if investors are not risk-neutral and if shocks to the 
volatility-generating  function are permanent or decay only very slowly, the 
process generating mean returns might also change. 
This paper studies three potential sources of instability in parameter 
estimates of stock return models.  First, expected returns may vary with 
time.  This is consistent with Keim and Stambaugh (1986),  Fama and French 
(1988),  and Chan  (1989).  Second,  return volatility may change,  which is 
consistent with the conditional heteroscedasticity model of Engle  (1982). 
Third,  observed returns may be affected by changes in the institutional 
features of the market.  Baillie and DeGennaro  (1989)  provide one example, demonstrating that the opportunity costs associated with delayed delivery 
have important effects on observed stock returns. 
Perhaps surprisingly,  none of these studies uses switching regressions. 
Goldfeld and Quandt's (1976)  D-method of switching regression,  deterministic 
switching based on time,  seems especially promising.  This method not only 
identifies switch points and estimates the model coefficients,  but also 
provides a parameter 0*  which measures the abruptness of the change.  If  w ' 
this parameter is statistically different from zero,  the switch is 
interpreted as gradual.  Otherwise,  the switch is characterized as abrupt. 
This paper applies the Goldfeld-Quandt method to a model of stock 
returns with three potential sources of parameter instability.  We model 
stock returns as a stochastic function of three components: a constant 
expected return;  the financing costs associated with delayed delivery  (an 
institutional feature identified by Lakonishok and Levi [I9821 and Flannery 
and Protopapadakis [I9881 and tested by DeGennaro [I9901 and Baillie and 
DeGennaro [1989]); and a rational expectations error. 
Each of the three sources of parameter instability makes different 
predictions for the nature of parameter changes in this model.  If expected 
returns are the only source of parameter variation, the estimate of the 
expected return must be the source of the regime change.  The switch should 
be gradual,  since changes in expected returns are probably slow.  If 
financing costs or the delivery and payments mechanism is responsible for a 
regime change, the switch might be abrupt or gradual: regulatory change 
should lead to abrupt switches,  while technological evolution should lead to 
gradual changes.  Finally, it is unclear whether switches due to volatility 
should be abrupt or gradual.  For example, one interpretation of shifts driven by changes in volatility is that they proxy for changes in omitted 
variables.  The switching regressions method does not permit distinguishing 
between this and other less-ambitious interpretations,  which treat 
volatility as exogenous.  However,  other researchers such as French, 
Schwert,  and Stambaugh  (1987)  use a GARCH-in-mean  model to show that 
volatility shocks are permanent.  This suggests that regime shifts resulting 
from changes in volatility are likely to be abrupt. 
We study two eight-year sample periods from 1971 to 1986 and find that 
both contain a regime shift driven by an abrupt change in volatility.  In 
addition, the switches occur during important events affecting the economic 
environment: the first switch, driven by an sudden increase in volatility, 
occurs during the turmoil of an international monetary crisis in 1973,  and 
the second,  marked by an abrupt decrease in volatility,  is on the first 
trading day after the reappointment of Paul Volcker as chairman of the 
Federal Reserve Board in 1983.  Although the other parameters are in some 
cases qualitatively different, they do not vary enough to produce changes in 
our model of stock returns. 
Our conclusion that changes in volatility are of primary importance 
gains force when one considers that our model never identifies switches near 
periods of important changes in the economy that might well have been 
expected to affect the other coefficients in the model.  For example,  stock 
returns were large from late 1971 through early 1973 and again after August 
1982,  while investors experienced low returns and even losses in portions of 
the early 1970s,  particularly in 1974, and from the late 1970s through the 
middle of 1980.  These large ex post changes in returns might be expected to 
affect the coefficients of our model;  in fact, they do not.  Similarly,  our market proxy for the daily interest rate is the federal funds rate.  The 
changes in Federal Reserve operating procedures on October 6,  1979 and 
October 9,  1982 might be expected to change the efficacy of this proxy; in 
fact,  this parameter is never identified as the source of the change in 
regimes. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section  I develops the model of 
stock returns, section I1 outlines our method,  section I11 describes the 
data and presents the results, and section IV contains our conclusions. 
I. The Hodel 
Three elements compose the model of stock returns.  The first is the 
expected return.  If the expected return is constant, the switching- 
regressions method will not identify a regime change driven by variation in 
expected returns.  If the expected return does change, the method should 
position a switch at the appropriate point. 
The second component captures a source of volatility due to an 
institutional feature of the stock market.  Stock exchange procedures 
require the purchaser to deliver a bank check to the seller five business 
days from the date of the trade.  Lakonishok and Levi  (1982)  note that such 
checks require another business day to clear, making the total payment delay 
six business days.  Until final payment is made, the stock trade remains 
conditional and official title stays with the seller,  who in turn cannot use 
the proceeds of the sale.  Baillie and DeGennaro  (1989)  show that,  although 
often ignored,  this aspect of securities trading is an important determinant 
of stock returns.  Since Kane and Unal  (1988)  interpret switches as evidence 
of movements in omitted variables,  we control for this potential source of 
structural instability. The third component of the model is a rational expectations error. 
Although the model's  first two components control for two possible sources 
of structural shifts,  changes in the variance of this error itself are 
possible.  If such a change occurs, the switching regression method should 
identify it by positioning a switch at the point where volatility increases 
or decreases. 
To derive the model, we first write the stock price  (or  the level of a 
stock index) at t as a function of the price at time t-1,  the stock return 
from t-1  to t,  and the dividend yield, 
Pt  =  Pt_l  * exp(Rt  -  dt)  9  (1) 
where Pt  and Pt-l  are the observed prices at t and t-1,  R  is the return at  t 
t,  and dt is the dividend yield at t. 
If buyers compensate sellers for payment delays,  the prices in equation 
(1)  diverge from prices that would be observed if delays did not exist.  We 
call this price PL.  The observed price at t,  Pt,  equals P' plus  t 
compensation  for delayed payment.  The observed price is 
where Dt is the number of calendar days from the trade date, t,  until a 
check presented at settlement clears, and c  is the rate of compensation  i,t 
for each day i during the delay for trades made at t.  If the rate of 
compensation is positive,  P  is greater than P'  t  t' 
Since equation  (2)  holds at any t,  we can also write 
Substituting  (2)  and  (3)  into  (1)  yields Taking natural logs and rearranging obtains 
Dt  Dt-l 
Rt  =  [log(P;)  -  l~g(P;-~)  +  dtl +  (i&lci,t)  -  i&l  Ci,t-l.  (5) 
Dt  Dt-l  In  equation (5), i&l~i,f  and  I:  c  i-1  i,t-1  control for differences in 
financing costs due to payment delays in the return R  At t-1,  the  t  ' 
observed price Pt_l  is the value of the asset if delays do not occur, plus 
compensation for delayed payment.  Similarly, Pt  reflects the unobservable 
Dt  value of the asset, plus compensation  for delayed payment.  Unless iglci,t 
Dt-lc  equals  I:  i-1  i,t-1'  the observed return misstates the actual return on the 
asset since it includes this change. 
Some proxy for c  must be used for empirical work.  We use federal 
funds rates because they are responsive to economic conditions and are 
Dt  readily available.  Substituting federal funds rates f for c in  C c  and  i=l i,  t 
Dt-l 
izl 'i,t-l  and letting A indicate changes,  equation  (5)  becomes 
The term in brackets represents the realized return in the absence of 
delays,  and the second term controls for the delays.  Writing the realized 
return as the expected return plus error,  we obtain 
Dt  For notational convenience, we write A(iglfi,t)  as AFt.  Because these 
AF  may be jointly determined with Rt,  we use predicted values of AFt,  t 
A 
labeled AFt, in our empirical work to avoid problems with simultaneity. 
Substituting this into  (7)  and assuming a constant expected return,  the test 
equation is: Since investors are risk averse and hold stocks in the expectation of 
earning a positive return, Po  should be positive and a one-tailed test is 
appropriate.  Similarly, if buyers compensate sellers for payment delays,  p1 
is positive and a one-tailed test is again appropriate. 
11, The Switching Regression Nethod 
The switching regression technique we use was introduced by Goldfeld 
and Quandt  (1973, 1976).  This technique allows the data to identify the 
switch point and provides information about the type of switch  (abrupt  or 
gradual).  Lin and Oh  (1984)  use this technique to test the stability of the 
U.S.  short-run money demand function,  while Kane and Unal  (1988)  use it to 
study changes in the market's  perception of risk in the stock of banks and 
savings and loans.  The two-regime stock return is described as follows: 
where 
and the other variables are as defined previously, with the superscripts a 
and b denoting the regime index.  The autoregressive structure is necessary 
because we use a portfolio return as the dependent variable.  Although 
Scholes and Williams  (1977)  show that a moving-average parameterization is 
strictly correct in this case,  higher-order autocorrelations approach zero 
very rapidly for small values of p.  In addition,  the autoregressive 
structure is convenient for computation. 
The regime change is assumed to be time-dependent.  The two regimes may 
be combined by introducing a dummy variable D as follows: where Dt  indicates the probability of a specific regime for each observation 
t.  If the regime change occurs abruptly, then 
* 
=  0,  if t I  t 
Dt  = 1,  otherwise. 
However,  if the regime change is gradual,  the dummy variable may be 
approximated by a continuous function that increases gradually from zero to 
one for observations two through N.  One approximation suggested by Goldfeld 
*  2. 
and Quandt  (1976)  is the normal distribution with two parameters,  t  and u . 
W 
- 
W  * 
where t  indicates the central point of the switch and u2 characterizes the 
W 
length of the switching period.  The switch is gradual if 2 is 
significantly  different from zero. 
* 
When a regime change occurs at t,  it is likely that the first-order 
autoregressive error parameters will also change.  Therefore, this change 
a  b  must be built into the log-likelihood function.  Assuming that u  and u  are  t  t 
independently and normally distributed with zero mean and variance a  2(a)  and 
2(b)  the variance of the combined error is  Q, 
Therefore,  the log-likelihood function is 
A where N equals the number of observations and 
2  (a)  We maximize equation  (14)  with respect to the model coefficients,  a, 
2  2(b)  pa pb  tt and oo using the GQOPT software package written by Goldfeld,  Q, 
Quandt, and Ertel.  We use the GRADX routine to search for the maximum.  To 
avoid mistaking a local maximum for the global maximum,  we use several 
different sets of initial estimates for each sample period with the 
-  10  convergence criterion set at 10. 
111. Data and Results 
A.  Data 
The proxy for the continuously compounded stock return is the natural 
logarithm of one plus the return on the value-weighted portfolio,  including 
dividends,  provided by the Center for Research in Security Prices  (CRSP)  at 
the University of Chicago.  We use 16 years of daily data,  from 1971 through 
1986,  a total of 4,042  observations.  Federal funds rates are from the 
Federal Reserve Board.  Predicted values of AFt are obtained by regressing 
AF  on the five most recently observed values of AF available at t.  We 
t 
divide our sample into two eight-year samples  (containing  2,019  and 2,023 
observations,  respectively) for two reasons.  First, the computational 
demands of our method are heavy.  Second, we find switches in both eight- 
year samples.  Applying our method to the full sample must, therefore, 
misspecify the dimension of our model: we would need at least two 
breakpoints to adequately describe the data for the full 16 years. B. Results 
First Eight-Year Samole.  This sample extends from January 1,  1970 through 
December 31,  1978.  We first determine if a switch exists in this sample. 
To do this,  we use two methods.  The first follows Quandt  (1958):  we. 
estimate the model with no switches and again with one switch.  We then 
conduct a likelihood ratio test.  Twice the difference in the log- 
likelihoods is distributed chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of restrictions implied by the null hypothesis,  which is six in this 
case.'  The second method is due to Schwarz  (1978).  Schwarz defines N as 
the total number of observations and kr as the number of parameters that 
must be estimated in the r regimes.  He proves that subtracting .5krlog(N) 
from the maximum of the log-likelihood provides asymptotically optimal 
estimates. 
The results are contained in table 1.  The value of the log-likelihood 
for the no-switch case is 6858.6,  while for the one-switch case,  the value 
is 6938.6.  Twice the difference in these values easily exceeds the 1 
percent critical value of 16.81,  so the likelihood-ratio test rejects the 
model with no switches in favor of at least one switch in the first 
eight-year sample.  The Schwarz criterion agrees. 
The model positions the switch on Wednesday,  March 14,  1973. 
Consistent with the model,  PO and p1 are positive in both regimes.  The 
stock returns implied by the intercepts are close to the actual stock 
returns during the sample.  The estimated value of 8:  (before  the switch) 
implies a return of 12.51 percent, while the realized value was 12.14 
b  percent.  The rate implied by Po (after  the switch) is 2.11 percent versus 
the realized return of 2.13 percent.  The coefficients on the payment delay, b  8;  and bl,  are positive and statistically significant  .  Consistent with 
Lakonishok and Levi  (1982)  and DeGennaro (1990),  both exceed unity, 
suggesting that the rate of compensation for delays is greater than the 
federal funds rate. 
The parameter 2 is of special interest.  Goldfeld and Quandt  (1976) 
interpret it as the degree of discrimination  between regimes,  or the 
"mushiness" of the switch.  Here, its estimated value is 4.90 days, and its 
2  t-ratio is only 0.56.  We cannot reject the hypothesis that a  is zero,  so 
W 
we conclude that the switch was abrupt. 
To determine which parameter is responsible for the regime change,  we 
conduct t-tests on each of the four pairs of parameters.  These t-tests 
reveal that the regime change is driven by a  2(a)  and a,  2(b)  the residual 
variances.  The t-value is  -14.05,  which is easily significant at the 1 
percent level.  In contrast, despite the 31 percent decline in the 
b  intercept, the t-value for #I:  and #I0  is only 0.88,  which is not significant. 
The standard errors of the parameters are too large to permit the model to 
attribute a change to these parameters.  The t-values for the other 
parameters are also insignificant: for #I1  the t-value is only 1.28,  and for 
p  it is 1.37. 
Although Kane and Unal  (1988)  caution against attributing regime 
changes to a specific event,  we believe it is worthwhile to make such an 
attempt.  Kane and Unal use monthly data and obtain urn as large as nine 
months.  As they note, several events typically occur during such extended 
periods.  In contrast,  our estimated a  is less than three days,  greatly 
0 
reducing the number of events that can occur.  Nevertheless,  we offer the 
evidence below as suggestive rather than conclusive. To determine whether the economy was subject to any economic shocks 
during the week surrounding the Wednesday,  March 14,  1973 switch point,  we 
examined the Wall Street Journal for evidence of unusual events.  We found 
several.  The Thursday,  March 8 edition reported that Arthur Burns, then 
chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, told Congress that the "...task  of 
overhauling the international monetary system must be done in a matter of 
months rather than years."  The report concluded that his statements 
"...indicated a new level of urgency."  The following Monday,  the 
penultimate day of the first regime, the Journal reported that six Common 
Market countries agreed jointly to float their currencies against the U.S. 
dollar.  Further, the Gaullists retained their majority in the French 
National Assembly,  which was widely viewed as making French participation in 
the joint float possible.  The Treasury devalued the U.S.  dollar that 
evening.  Consistent with the empirical result that the completion of the 
regime change took about a week, the United States did not agree to 
participate in the plan at this time,  promising only to meet that Friday. 
Two events immediately after the selected break point may also have 
added uncertainty to the markets and contributed to the increase in 
volatility that motivated the switch.  First,  on March 14,  the morning of 
the first day of the second structural regime, the Journal carried a 
front-page story regarding the Watergate proceedings.  While such stories 
were common at the time, this article reported the Senate Judiciary 
Committee's "direct challenge" to then-President Richard M. Nixon.  The 
president had blocked an aide from appearing before the committee, but 
capitulated on March 13,  the last day of the first structural regime.  This 
cleared the way for new and likely damaging testimony. The second event was reported March 16.  In a lengthy article on page 
three, the Journal reported that the Securities and Exchange Commission 
planned major changes in the central market structure,  aimed primarily at 
"...eliminating many of the competitive differences between the nation's 
stock exchanges and non-exchange markets."  Certain anticipated changes were 
substantial.  For example,  the Third Market,  a network of securities dealers 
who trade away from the floor of the exchanges,  would be required to meet 
the same obligations as the specialists on the exchanges.  Brokers for large 
trades,  called "block positioners,"  would be forced to break the block to 
fill limit orders with the specialist.  The proposed regulations would also 
impose uniform and more stringent capital requirements for specialists 
operating on regional exchanges.  Although the SEC did not expect the new 
requirements to become effective for at least two years, the scope of the 
changes may well have added to the uncertainty surrounding the events of the 
week.  In contrast,  we find no evidence of events that might have caused 
changes in expected stock returns,  delivery terms,  or our federal funds 
proxy for the opportunity cost those terms entail. 
Without making expected stock returns endogenous,  it is hard to say 
what event might cause a change in expected returns.  However,  Chan  (1989) 
conjectures that output shocks might be one factor; we find no evidence of a 
substantial  shock in that area.  This does not imply that output shocks have 
no effect on expected returns.  In fact,  because the change in our model is 
driven by a change in a factor other than expected returns, Chan predicts we 
would not find news of any obvious output shock during that period. 
However,  we do uncover events supporting the result that changes in market 
volatility drive the structural shift.  We conclude that the evidence provides strong support for the hypothesis that the source of structural 
change in our model is due to market volatility.  We find little or no 
evidence, either in the empirical results or in the print media, to support 
the hypotheses that expected returns or rates of compensation during payment 
delays cause regime changes. 
Second Eieht-Year  Sam~le,  Table 2 contains the results from the second 
eight-year sample, which extends from January 1,  1979 to December 31,  1986. 
In general,  the results are similar to the first eight-year sample. 
Maximizing equation  (14)  for the no-switch case obtains a log-likelihood of 
6831.1.  Under the one-switch model, the value is 6861.8.  Twice the 
difference of the log-likelihood is again distributed chi-square with six 
degrees of freedom,  and again it easily exceeds the 1 percent critical value 
of 16.81.  As is true in the first eight-year sample, the Schwarz criterion 
also rejects the model with no switch,  and we conclude that at least one 
switch occurs in the second eight-year sample. 
The data suggest the switch occurs on Monday,  June 20,  1983.  All 
parameter estimates are consistent with the model: /IO  and /I  are positive  1 
and significant both before and after the switch.  As would be expected 
given the larger ex post returns on stocks during the second eight-year 
sample,  both /IO  coefficients are larger than in table 1.  The coefficients 
imply rates of return of 19.24 percent and 13.24 percent before and after 
the change,  versus the CRSP realized returns of 19.10 and 13.11 percent, 
respectively.  The coefficients on the variables that control for payment 
a  b  delays, p1 and pl,  are also correctly signed and significantly different 
from zero.  Since neither differs from unity,  we conclude that the rate of 
compensation  for delays is approximately equal to the federal funds rate. 2  The degree of abruptness parameter,  ow, is 6.72,  and the t-ratio is 0.62: we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the change was abrupt. 
T-tests clearly show that the change was driven by the volatility 
parameters,  a  2(a)  and ~7:'~)  which decline from about 8.2 x  to about. 
5.3 x  10:~ The t-value is 7.48,  which is significant at the 1 percent 
level.  For the intercept,  slope,  and autoregressive parameters,  the 
comparable statistics are only 0.56,  1.08,  and -0.18,  respectively,  none of 
which approaches significance.  We again conclude that volatility is of 
critical importance to the model. 
Economic events at the time of the switch provide more evidence in 
support of our conclusion that volatility is the source of the regime 
change.  On Saturday,  June 18,  1983,  President Ronald Reagan reappointed 
Paul Volcker as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board.  In its Monday 
edition,  the Wall Street Journal reported this "... ended months of guessing 
about whether the president would retain Volcker ...."  Further, the 
consensus opinion was that this would help stabilize the economy.  For 
example,  the chairman of a $10 billion trust company called Volcker's 
reappointment "... an incredibly positive move ...."  We believe the model's 
ability to determine a switch on the first day that economic agents could 
respond to the reappointment is compelling evidence in favor of the model. 
It also highlights the influence such major political figures wield over the 
volatility of financial markets. 
Given the intuitively pleasing result that a major economic event 
coincides with the selected switch date, it is perhaps surprising that o2 is 
W 
as large as 6.72,  even though it is statistically zero.  Certain other 
events during the period,  however, suggest that another long-term disruption in the economy at this time might have been feared, thereby increasing 
volatility and counteracting the calming influence of the Volcker 
reappointment.  On Thursday,  June 16,  1983, the Journal reported that, "... 
in a major and unexpected decision ...,"  the Washington State Court had 
freed Washington utilities from their obligation to pay $2.25 billion of 
debt on canceled power plants, dramatically increasing the likelihood of a 
default by the largest municipal bond issuer in the nation.  James Durham, 
vice president and senior counsel for another utility,  was quoted as saying 
this implies "...  commitments made in good faith can be dishonored by 
government bodies.  Apparently nobody's word is good for anything anymore-- 
even if it's  in writing."  The next day's  edition carried a major story 
reporting that the probable default was raising interest costs for all large 
borrowers in the Northwest,  not just for utilities,  and that the North 
Carolina Municipal Power Agency had postponed a $350 million offering 
indefinitely as a result of the ruling.  This court ruling may have 
increased uncertainty,  which contaminated the economic climate around the 
Z  Volcker reappointment.  This might explain why ow is not closer to zero 
Other Dates.  Also of interest are dates that might plausibly be expected to 
cause a change in the structure of our model,  but which are not selected. 
For example,  Rogalski  (1984)  selects October 1,  1974--the day the New York 
Stock Exchange extended trading an additional 30 minutes--as the beginning 
of his sample period.  He may suspect that this altered the daily pattern of 
returns.  Our results, however,  suggest researchers need not be concerned 
with this non-event.  Also not selected is February 8,  1980,  when the 
Federal Reserve moved its money supply announcements from Thursday afternoon 
to Friday afternoon.  Cornell  (1985)  tests whether the intraweek pricing pattern changed after the introduction  of stock-index futures trading on 
April 21,  1982.  He concludes it did not,  and our results support his. 
Although all of these changes might have affected Po  or 02  apparently none 
did so to the extent that other events affected a  2(a)  and a.  2(b)  We add that 
although the introduction of futures trading is sometimes blamed for 
increasing stock return volatility,  we find nothing to support this claim. 
Indeed,  political activity appears to be far more important. 
Other events could conceivably have affected PI.  For example, in 1977 
brokerage houses began offering cash management accounts.  These accounts 
became widespread by about 1979, and might have altered the time between 
stock transactions and the crediting of accounts.  Congress passed the 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and-Monetary  Control Act of 1980, 
creating incentives to invest in faster check-processing technologies.  This 
would reduce the delay and possibly cause the structural change.  Since we 
use the federal funds rate as our proxy for the financing costs during the 
payment delays encountered in stock transactions,  one might have expected 
October 6,  1979 to have been selected.  On that date, the Federal Reserve 
began targeting the level of nonborrowed reserves rather than the federal 
funds rate.  After this decision,  the federal funds rate is known to have  . 
become more volatile.  This could conceivably have affected 8;  and Bb  On  1  ' 
October 9,  1982,  the Fed began attempting to stabilize rates.  This, too, 
might be expected to have caused a change.  Yet,  none of these dates are 
selected.  The data continually indicate that market volatility is the 
factor determining structural change in our model of stock returns.  We find 
no evidence to support the hypotheses that changes in expected returns, rates of compensation for delays,  our proxy for interest costs, or the 
autoregressive parameters contribute to structural changes in our model. 
A Sensitivity  Test 
As reported by Baillie and DeGennaro  (1989)  and DeGennaro (1990), the 
variable that controls for the opportunity costs associated with delivery 
procedures is always significant.  As a sensitivity check,  we estimate 
equations  (9)  and  (10)  without including this variable.  The results are not 
substantially affected.  A regime change is identified in each eight-year 
subperiod,  although not at the same point.  For the first eight-year period, 
the break occurs on February 21,  1973, three weeks earlier than in table 1 
For the second eight years, the switch is placed on March 15,  1983,  three 
months sooner than in table 2.  No other differences are apparent.  For 
example,  as is true for equations  (9)  and (lo),  the regime change is driven 
by shifts in o2 in both subperiods.  Because likelihood-ratio tests reveal 
that the models in tables 1 and 2 are preferred to this simple model,  we do 
not report the simpler model in tabular form,  but the results are available 
on  request. 
IV, Conclusions 
This paper models stock returns as a function of three components: a 
constant expected return, the impact of the mechanism for executing trades, 
and a rational expectations error.  We examine changes in these parameters 
using Goldfeld and Quandt's (1976)  deterministic switching based on time. 
This method not only allows us to learn if and when the regression structure 
changes,  but also provides a measure of the speed of transition from one 
regime to the other.  We find that,  regardless of the sample period,  all 
regime shifts are due to changes in the estimated variance of the error. This is true even if the ex post return on the stock portfolio or the 
estimated rate of compensation for financing costs changes substantially. 
In addition,  these changes occur during substantial changes in the business 
environment,  driven by important political decisions.  We interpret these 
findings as suggesting that government policy strongly affects the 
volatility of the stock market. Footnotes 
1. The null hypothesis of no switch restricts PO, pl, p, and u to be equal 
in both regimes, as well as restricting D = 0  and uw =  0.  These last two 
effectively say that we need not estimate either the location of the 
switch or its variance in the one-regime model. References 
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Regressions of the rate of return on the CRSP 
value-weighted index, including dividends,  on the predicted 
change in the federal funds rates during payment delays. 
First Eight-Year Subperiod  ............................................................................ 
Rt 
= return on CRSP value-weighted  index, including dividends. 
A 
AFt = predicted change in the proxy for financing costs, the total return on 
federal funds during payment delays at t. 
............................................................................ 
Jan. 5,  1970 -  Jan. 5,  1970 -  March 13,  1973 
Dec. 31,  1978  March 14,  1973 -  Dec. 31,  1978 
............................................................................ 
Estimate  Estimate 
Parameter (t-statistic)  (t-statistic) 
............................................................................ 
Schwarz Criterion  6843.4  6900.5 
................................................................................ Note: All except p  and o2 are one-tailed tests. 
W 
a. Significant at the 1 percent level. 
b. Significant at the 10 percent level. 
c. Significant at the 5 percent level. 
Source: Authors' computations. TABLE  2 
Regressions of the rate of return on the CRSP 
value-weighted index,  including dividends,  on the predicted 
change in the federal funds rates during payment delays. 
Second Eight-Year  Subperiod 
............................................................................ 
Rt 
= return on CRSP value-weighted index, including dividends. 
A 
AFt = predicted change in the proxy for financing costs, the total return on 
federal funds during payment delays at t. 
............................................................................ 
Jan. 1,  1979 -  Jan. 1,  1979 -  June 19,  1983 
Dec. 31,  1986  June 20,  1983 -  Dec. 31,  1986 
............................................................................ 
Estimate  Estimate 
Parameter (t-statistic)  (t-statistic) 
............................................................................ 
Log-  likelihood  6831.1  6861.8 
Schwarz Criterion  6815.9  6823.8 
................................................................................ Note: All except p  and r2  are one-tailed tests. 
W 
a. Significant at the 1 percent level. 
b. Significant at the 5 percent level. 
Source: Authors' computations. 